AFTER 19 days of haggling and brinkmanship,
the exhausted negotiators dragged themselves over the finishing line of a
historic deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, and thus prevent it from
getting a nuclear weapon.
Beyond this, the accord offers at least a
chance of more normal relations between the Islamic republic and America,
embittered since the Iranian revolution of 1979. Even as Iran negotiated the
deal, its supporters ritually chanted “Death to America”.
Barack Obama sought to shrug off criticism that he had been naïve in
seeking a compromise with Iran, saying the agreement was not built on trust,
but on verification. “This deal meets every single one of the bottom lines that
we established when we achieved a framework this spring,” he said, “Every pathway
to a nuclear weapon is cut off, and the inspection and transparency regime
necessary to verify that objective will be put in place.
As residents in Tehran began to honk their
horns in celebration, President Hassan Rouhani spoke of “a new chapter” in
relations with the outside world.
The deal struck between Iran and the P5+1 (the permanent members of the
UN Security Council and Germany) in Vienna in the early hours of July 14th was
broadly in line with the parameters of the Lausanne accord of April 2nd
referred to by Mr Obama. The framework understanding contained limitations on
enrichment levels, centrifuge numbers (see chart) and types, and a cap on
Iran's stockpiles of low-enriched uranium. It also calls for the conversion of
the Arak reactor to produce far less plutonium than the current design, and
restricts research and development on more advanced centrifuges. Sunset dates
for the various provisions, ranging from a decade to as long as 25 years were
also established. In return, Iran will get relief from sanctions that have
crippled its economy.
But the reason that it has taken so long to reach today’s accord—the
first deadline was June 30th, while others have come and gone, is that the
framework agreement left many issues unresolved, all of them critical to
whether a comprehensive deal could be reached.
Furthermore, there were worrying differences
between the detailed American account of what had been agreed and the far
vaguer public interpretation of the accord by the Iranians. These were subsequently
amplified by statements about “red lines” by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, in which he appeared to reject key provisions of Lausanne,
particularly those relating to inspection of suspicious sites.
The unfinished business the negotiators have struggled to complete fell
into five main categories. The first is the degree to which Iran would be
allowed to continue development and testing of faster, more advanced
centrifuges that would allow it to ramp up to industrial-scale uranium enrichment
as limits are eased in the out-years of the agreement. The second is a method
for Iran to account to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the
“possible military dimensions” of its nuclear programme that would fall short
of a confession but give the agency the confidence needed to declare Iran’s
nuclear activities from now onwards to be entirely peaceful.
Third, and arguably most vital, was establishing an inspection and
verification regime that would be sufficiently rigorous to give rapid notice of
any attempt by Iran to violate its undertakings, for example by conducting
prohibited activity at a clandestine site. Iran had said it would implement the
Additional Protocol (AP) of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but the
supreme leader had balked at its implications, declaring inspections of
military sites a red line.
Fourth, was a means for determining the extent and intent of possible
Iranian violations and an appropriate range of consequences were it to be found
to be in breach of its undertakings. Lastly, disagreements persisted over the
speed and scope of sanctions relief, for example whether the sale of offensive
weapons would still be subject to a UN embargo, which proved especially
contentious in the final stages of the negotiations. There was mention of a
mechanism for at least some sanctions to snap back automatically if Iran was
caught cheating, but not detail as to how that might work.
It appears that all the outstanding issues have been resolved. On the
question of the whether or not the arms embargo should be lifted, as the
Iranians were demanding, a compromise has been thrashed out that appears to
favour the tough line taken by American negotiators. The embargo, as it applies
to the sale of offensive weapons to Iran, will remain in force for a further
five years, while the ban on any technologies relating to ballistic missiles
will stay in place for eight years. That means that the Russians, for example,
will be able to go ahead with the sale of the S-300 air defence system, but
presumably not of strike aircraft or tanks.
A mechanism has also been established for dealing with possible Iranian
violations of the deal that would allow sanctions to snap back automatically.
If there are allegations that Iran has not met its obligations, a joint
commission will seek to resolve the dispute for 30 days. If that effort fails
it would be referred to the UN Security Council, which would have to vote to
continue sanctions relief. A veto by a permanent member would therefore mean
that sanctions would be reimposed. The whole process would take 65 days.
On the vital issues concerning the verification regime, it looks as if
Iran has both withdrawn its objections to the IAEA carrying out investigations
into previous activities relating to research into “weaponisation” (including
providing access to scientists that agency want to interview) and will now
allow inspectors to visit any sites they deem suspicious, including military
facilities. That said, what has been agreed is a form of so-called “managed
access”. Inspectors will not be able to conduct “anywhere, any time” visits.
Instead, they will have to give grounds for their concerns about prohibited
activities and give the Iranians an opportunity to address them before access
is made mandatory by the joint commission. All this must take place within two
weeks. Refusal by Iran to provide inspectors access that persisted for more
than another week would be deemed a violation of the agreement and therefore
subject to re-imposition of sanctions. Although the process is a little
convoluted, it still smashes through one of the supreme leader’s cherished red
lines.
Iran will be able to begin deployment of advanced enrichment centrifuges
after the first 10 years of an agreement, but for 15 years it will have to keep
its stockpile of low-enriched uranium below 300kg. After that, Iran will be
able to develop the industrial-scale enrichment it seeks, but while its
breakout time to a bomb will notionally diminish from the one year sought by
the agreement, its obligations under the AP are perpetual, ensuring that even
as its nuclear programme starts to expand again it will do so under conditions
of far greater transparency than in the past. As long as future American
presidents remain committed to preventing Iran from ever having a bomb and will
use force if necessary to prevent it, deterrence should be maintained.
The concern of critics of Barack Obama, both in Washington and beyond,
was that the president’s perceived desperation to burnish his legacy with an
historic deal would result in dangerous compromises surrendered at the last
minute to the wily Iranians. However, that was never likely (Iran’s need for a
deal has always been much greater than America’s) and it is not borne out by
the details of what has appears to have been agreed. Some, such as Israel’s
prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and the jockeying Republican presidential
candidates, regard any deal with Iran that does not fully dismantle its nuclear
infrastructure—an unattainable goal, as they know perfectly well—as not worth
having. For Mr Netanyahu, the deal was “a bad mistake of historic proportions.”
But judged by more pragmatic standards, the deal, while not perfect,
appears much better than any of the plausible alternatives. Republicans in
Congress and their hardline counterparts in Tehran will still try to prevent
the deal’s implementation. But they are unlikely to succeed. Mr Obama told
opponents its opponents in Washington that it fully met the national security
interests of America and its allies. He warned: “So I will veto any legislation
that prevents the successful implementation of this deal. We do not have to
accept an inevitable spiral into conflict. And we certainly shouldn't seek it.
And precisely because the stakes are so high this is not the time for politics
or posturing. Tough talk from Washington does not solve problems.”
Mr Obama looks to have enough Democratic senators on his side to sustain
his veto. As for Iran, it is almost inconceivable that its supreme leader,
despite his ambivalence about many aspects of the deal, will now allow the work
of his negotiators to unravel.
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