BY
December witnesses local elections in several areas in Ukraine. 11th December and 18th December respectively saw voting in newly formed combined territorial communities designed to best leverage local politics (in particular budgets) within “decentralisation” – or so the theory goes.
Clearly at the time of writing the results of 18th December voting is unknown.
Results from 11th December are known.
Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna Party secured 123 local deputies, in part because when it comes to party outreach into local politics Batkivshchyna has always had the best party administrative set up in Ukraine. No other party can or does come close to Batkivshchyna when it comes to the number of local and regional party offices.
A reader may ponder just how well Batkivshchyna would do if it were actually a real political party if only it could free itself from being nothing more than a political vehicle for Yulia Tymoshenko. It could then develop some genuine policies that define what the party stands for rather than having to cope with Ms Tymoshenko’s ego, her empty populist rhetoric, and politically expedient flip-flopping.
When it comes to the number of elected deputies, second with 86 came Nash Krai, and Block Poroshenko coming third with 60 elected officials.
As regular readers will know however, Nash Krai is a technical party created by The Bankova (Presidential Administration) to split the Opposition Block (former Party of Regions) vote in October 2014. This it successfully did and has continued to do.
That is not to imply that Nash Krai is without agency. It certainly can and does do its own political thing and also votes in the interests of its parliamentarians (not necessarily its constituents) – ergo not always in line with the designs of the President or Government does it vote. That however is within the parameters expected of a technical party if the facade of independence is to be projected. When it truly counts support for The Bankova is expected.
However, Nash Krai as a technical party may prove to be problematic in the near future. It is starting to convincingly out perform Block Poroshenko at the ballot box frequently. Technical parties also expensive. Not only does Block Poroshenko require financing, so does Nash Krai. If finances are diminishing and the electorate continue to swell the Nash Krai machinery via electoral success after electoral success, then sooner or later the tail may start to wag the dog.
That tail wagging dog issue may start in the provinces, but eventually it may reach the centre. This combined with quality local candidates preferring to run for parties other than that of the president will, by extension, make the next Verkhovna Rada elections interesting. Even if (or when) state administrative resources are misused by the current powers that be to further their cause, how likely is it that it will be returned the largest party?
For now The Bankova’s pet project (Nash Krai) may remain loyal when required to be so – but for how long?
It is perhaps now necessary to focus upon how well it does vis a vis Block Poroshenko in every electoral vote henceforth, for losing control of the provinces because a pet project goes rouge will have an impact come larger national elections if the decentralised local budgets cannot be abused for the electioneering benefit of those at the centre of power. Things begin to fray at the edges – and can completely unwind if care is not taken.
(Lo it is no surprise that since new legislation came into force in May 2016, new regional Governors selected by transparent “competition” have all been Block Poroshenko.)
Further, these elections occur under an illegitimate Central Election Committee. As noted in an October entry, 12 of the 15 CEC members have long since lost their legal mandates to be part of the CEC. That elections continue under a clearly illegitimate CEC is no surprise. (The entry also explains why the current electoral laws are unlikely to change.)
As stated in the aforementioned link – “However, despite any and all the political rhetoric that will surround the CEC issue prior to the year end, it seems extremely unlikely that those who currently compose the current CEC will be changed or be given new mandates.
Firstly the budget and other legislative matters will simply take priority. Thus it follows that the issue will (once again) be put on the back-burner. Sometime in early 2017 would appear to be the most hopeful (perhaps even fanciful) time frame when it will be addressed. Secondly a reader may question any real political desire to actually do anything about changing the current CEC composition, providing doubt that early 2017 is indeed realistic.
As is always the case in Ukraine far too much attention will be given to who is put forward for the CEC positions rather than the institution, its role, and the legislation that it is charged with implementing and overseeing – and that legislation is certainly poor.”
Since that entry was written, the Chairman of the Central Election Committee, Mikhail Ohendovsky is now subject to criminal investigation by NABU (the anti corruption agency). Thus the “fanciful” early 2017 timeline in the above quote may now be a little more realistic. With the Chairman subject to criminal investigation and 12 of 15 committee members with mandates that expired in June 2014 it remains to be seen just how much longer this can be willfully ignored.
Thus the usually headline avoiding local elections this December may yet again avoid the headlines – but (local governance and local democracy aside) they act as a timely reminder of increasing reliance upon The Bankova technical party Nash Krai in the provinces by the Poroshenko centre and the prospect of tail wagging dog, and also the potential time frame for dealing with the still willfully unaddressed CEC issues.
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