Given the currently tense and complex
relationship between Russia and the United States, it seems like a daunting
task indeed to chart the future trajectory of U.S.-Russian affairs. But that is
precisely the task that the contributors to a comprehensive new
report published
by the Center for the National
Interest that
is titled The United States and Russia after the Ukraine Crisis: Three
Scenarios undertook. The volume examines several
possibilities—not predictions—for the course of U.S.-Russian relations in the
next two to three years.
In an event at the Center marking the release of
the report, Executive Director Paul J. Saunders, who also edited the report, served as
moderator. Authors of the scenarios comprised the discussion panel,
including Matthew Rojansky, Director of the Kennan Institute at the
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, and Samuel Charap, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies.
Charap, tasked with the challenge of outlining a
best-case scenario in which the United States and Russia relax tensions enough
to pursue a “functional relationship,” acknowledged that such an outcome is
unlikely. It would depend on both stability, that is, managing disagreements on
destabilizing issues, and compartmentalization, in which disagreements are
still pursued with vigor, but the two countries are able to collaborate on
mutual interests. The result, according to Charap, would be similar to the
current relationship between the United States and China—adversarial, but
cooperative on many issues.
Rojansky’s scenario envisions the Ukraine-Russia
confrontation developing into a frozen conflict similar to Moldova-Transnistria,
but on a much larger scale. Whereas much of Charap’s scenario was predicated on
positive developments in Ukrainian domestic politics, Rojansky’s scenario
assumes Ukrainian politics will be business as usual, with the spirit of Maidan
still alive but the energy to effect change squelched by previous
disappointments. Rojansky suggests that Russia will continue its “redefinition
process,” riding the historical wave of Slavophilism in an attempt to
distinguish itself from the West. U.S. politicians, in turn, will continue
“Russia-bashing,” which Rojansky referred to as an “easy and cost-free” way to
score political points. This would produce an enduring confrontation.
Nikolas Gvosdev, professor of national security studies at the
U.S. Naval War College and a contributing editor of The National
Interest, authored another scenario in the volume. Though he was unable to
be present at the event, Paul Saunders briefly outlined Gvosdev’s effort, which
draws upon existing differences within Europe and between the United States and
some European countries over policy toward Russia to illustrate the
consequences of a breakdown in consensus. In this case, Western European
“Ukraine fatigue” and a growing focus on more pressing crises, such as
terrorism and Syrian refugees, may lead to a realization on the part of some
nations that cooperation with Russia is necessary. Gvosdev’s scenario also
suggests that an “erosion of unity” fed by far-right parties in Europe may
swing the pendulum toward, rather than away from, Russia. EU members may
realize that individual nations’ interests trump the EU’s collective interest,
causing some of them to reconsider Russian sanctions.
Following the discussion of the report, the
panelists elaborated on the current Russian political environment. Rojansky
characterized the current Russian system as “inherently brittle,” resting on
the whims of Putin and his associates, the oligarchs and political elites. He
expressed concern about the “Russian nationalist fringe,” noting that Putin
“seems to be obliged to give these people a platform.” Charap suggested that
Putin will remain in power for some time, but warned that whoever succeeds him
may not necessarily be any better, and policymakers need to keep this in mind.
Saunders concurred, stating that the system will
be stable as long as the Russian people have faith in Putin. Without that
assurance, much like the stock market, there may be a political “crash,”
throwing the existing order into turmoil. Rojansky also noted the interesting
state of Russia’s economy as compared to Putin’s rhetoric, stating that Putin
is “giving liberal economic speeches. . . but there is rot at the top of the
system.” Rojansky suggested that Putin is indeed interested in economic
liberalization, but considering the lack of transparency, corporate governance,
and functional institutions in the country, the task seems insurmountable.
Charap agreed, stating that we are likely to continue to see an economic
“hybrid model” which has existed since the 1990s, with the state playing a
sizeable role in the Russian economy.
Charap noted that in his scenario, Russian economic
motivations would be a factor in improving relations between Russia and the
West. Rojansky said that U.S. sanctions on Russia are likely to continue, as
“economic warfare” remains the most popular tool of the moment. It seems to be
the method of choice because policymakers believe that it costs the United
States nothing while still inflicting damage on the opponent. In Europe,
however, the cost of sanctions is greater on both sides, and sanctions fatigue
may set in, leading Europe, or at least parts of it, to consider lifting or
loosening sanctions, much like in Gvosdev’s scenario of a divided Europe. When
it comes to Russia, uncertainty, it seems, is the only certainty, and as Charap
stated, responding to Russian behavior has so far been more important than any
distinctions in policy between the United States and Europe.
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