BY
At the end
of last month an entry
appeared that briefly mentioned the activities of domestic and foreign
intelligence/security agencies active within the Odessa Oblast.
“Further, it gives the Ukrainian SBU, Moldavian SIS
and Romanian SIE intelligence services all the more reason to simultaneously be
poking about in Mr Cisse’s backyard a little more forcefully/overtly than usual
– something that will not sit particularly well for very long.”
Whilst the mention of the Romanian SIE was fleeting, its activities are
quite clear for those who care to look. Romania, after all, has good
reason to actively monitor events within Ukraine, and in particular events that
are close to its borders – notwithstanding a large number of Romanian passport
holders/citizens within Moldova. A belligerent and truculent Kremlin with
a truly dependent vassal in Transnistria is naturally a cause for concern in
Bucharest.
Needless to say, relations both security/intelligence and
political/diplomatic between Romania and Ukraine have significantly improved
since the illegal annexation of Crimea. It would seem, considering the
“blind eye” being turned to SIE activity upon Ukrainian soil, those relations
continue to strengthen.
Between 12th and 15th March, Romanian President Iohannis first met
then President Komorowski of Poland, and then President Poroshenko (the
first visit of a Romanian president to Ukraine for 7 years). The upshot – “We must increase
regional cooperation between Ukraine, Poland and Romania, and create a certain
group of solidarity.” – President Iohannis.
To be sure, Romania, Poland and Ukraine (plus Lithuania) have a very
clear-eyed understanding of their shared perceived threats – and are the most
vocal about them compared to others in the immediate neighbourhood. These
threats it has to be said, are not shared to the same intensity, nor understood
to the same degree, by the supranational entities these nations belong to.
Neither the EU nor NATO, consisting of many of the same sovereign parts,
see the issues quite the same way as the Poles, Romanians or Lithuanians – not
to mention the organisational outsider in both cases, Ukraine (the victim and
current front line).
The shared position being to appease or accommodate the current Kremlin
is not the answer unless reinforcing a truculent, belligerent, aggressive,
unlawful attitude is the desired outcome. Stand firm now, or stand firm
later when the costs and difficulties will be much greater. In no way
should The Kremlin concerns become paramount, thus relegating everybody else’s
to much lesser importance – issues
your author has written about elsewhere.
It has also come to pass that the PolLitUkr Brigade, an entirely paper
entity since its initial floating in 2007, is now a reality headquartered in
Poland. As historical
entries relating to
the PolLitUkr Brigade have stated – “The assumption by many that two NATO nations creating a brigade
with a non-NATO nation would unnecessarily drag NATO into a confrontation with
an aggressor against Ukraine is perhaps something of a leap – despite initial
appearances. NATO, like the EU, has no control over the foreign policy of
its members – and its members can and do act unilaterally in the militarily
sphere without doing so under the NATO flag. “Coalitions
of the willing” and all that.”
There are numerous “push” and “pull” forces at work on many levels with
regard to the creation of “coalitions of the willing” in the absence of
consensus from the broader supranational entities. The question of
continued cohesiveness of the supranational “whole” the most fundamental of
those questions.
The most ferociously guarded sovereign spheres within the EU by Member
States are those of foreign policy and defence – hence the much (and perhaps
rightly) maligned EEAS is hamstrung from the start with regard to a
common defence or common foreign policy that consists of anything more than a
consensus driven lowest common denominator. As almost (but not) all EU Members
are NATO members, NATO suffers from similar issues to the EU when it comes to
shared threat assessments and associated intensity with which those threats are
felt by sovereign capitals. By extension, the collective response is
perhaps not what it could or should be to any identified threat.
Thus “coalitions of the willing” within, and including those without the
EU and NATO that share the same threat perceptions with the same intensity and
foreboding are an entirely natural result.
It so comes to pass that the newly elected Polish President Andrzej Duda
has not only floated the idea, but via Krzysztof Szczerski is going to
implement, a new format for “peace talks” relating to Ukraine. Simply
put, President Duda seemingly considers the Normandy Four format unsuitable,
unrepresentative and unable to project the thoughts and concerns of the
neighbours of Ukraine (and perhaps Ukraine itself).
He proposes and is instigating a group of the “strongest States“, including Poland, “toparticipate in talks on
restoring peace“.
Move over France and Germany – Poland, Lithuania and Romania are sitting
at the negotiating table too?
Does President Duda bring new ideas and possible solutions to the peace
table in lieu of Minsk II? – An agreement that all seem to cling to, otherwise
being devoid of other ideas.
If not, this raises the question about the usefulness of any “Duda
format” – particularly as the Kremlin will see any new format as robustly (and
rightly) in favour of Ukraine losing no more territorial space nor accepting
any more political/diplomatic black eyes for organisational time it once
needed, but no longer. Manipulating a hawkish Duda will not be as easy as
a dovish Hollande.
Why would the Kremlin entertain sitting down with a “Duda format”,
particularly when it can continue to obstruct and obfuscate within the Normandy
Four with impunity, whilst hoping to strike deals and talk to the US behind
everybody else’s back? Even downsizing to “Contact Group” talks under the
OSCE gaze seeming implies no potential (geo)political gains for a Duda format –
and sitting presidents don’t do downsized “Contact Groups” with unrecognised
armed groups.
Does President Duda see this newly proposed format as a replacement for
the Normandy Four when the Minsk II deadline at the year end passes without
Minsk II implementation? If so what positional shifts does he expect from
those positions currently taken by the parties involved? Who does he
expect to shift from their current positions (and what are the ramifications if
they do, not just for Ukraine, but for Poland, European and international
order)?
Considering the specific Ukraine-centric US-Kremlin communication line,
the Normandy Four, existing bilateral and supranational formal channels within
numerous involved entities (UN, CoE, EU etc), notwithstanding “Track Two” and
other less formal channels., some may wonder what yet another
“format/communication/negotiation/diplomatic” platform is likely to achieve
where others have failed.
There is no quick fix as long as the Kremlin doesn’t want/need one.
It takes no effort to see that Romania and Poland currently enjoy good
strategic partnerships with the US – think missile defence, but it also takes
little effort to see that the US is now front and centre leading the western
response to the events in Ukraine – both inside and outside of the Ukrainian
nation.
Once again, the glacial and inert supranational blob that is the EU is
reliant upon a far more nimble trans-Atlantic partner to lead in the immediate
matters pertaining to its own European continental security. The US, in
turn, can rely upon the inert EU blob to engage The Kremlin in many years of
bureaucratic and technocratic lawfare over the medium term.
Would a “Duda Format” relieve the US of that baton it picked up when
Germany ran out of room/desire within the EU constraints? Is it about
political and diplomatic energy? Does President Duda feel Germany and
France are simply flagging and paying grossly insufficient attention to The
Kremlin, distracted by other issues? Is it about Poland taking a lead
role in its neighbourhood under new leadership?
The Kremlin has thus far played the game regarding the “Normandy Four”
format as far as rhetoric goes – although certainly not as far as action is
concerned. As a result of rhetoric with deliberate lack of action, more
importantly for the Kremlin it has publicly achieved its goal of a direct
US-Kremlin communication line specifically with regard to Ukraine – exclusive
of direct German, French and Ukrainian input.
Whilst the US is very unlikely to strike deals behind the backs of
Ukraine, Germany and France, the Kremlin will nonetheless see the publicly
acknowledged establishment of this communication channel as a diplomatic and
domestic propaganda win when trying to present Russia as a “pole” of global
influence to its domestic audience. It will also, of course, try its very
best to get the US to strike deals behind the backs of Ukraine, and the
Europeans.
The Europeans collectively have gone as far as the can go being
consensus driven, and the “coalitions of the willing” currently beginning to
manifest in and of themselves, simply do not currently present the military,
political or diplomatic weight to give the Kremlin any pause for thought.
Perhaps therefore, Presidents Duda, Iohannis, Grybauskaitė and others
robustly aligned, believe they have levers that will make the Kremlin take note
– levers that France and Germany for whatever reason would not use or did not
have. If so what are they?
What does the Kremlin, its inner circle, and the security apparatus that
surrounds it care about that has thus far been spared any European attention?
If there is nothing left that has EU consensus, what of the “coalitions
of the willing” and Kremlin shenanigans within their nations? What impact
would it have?
A coordinated seizing of Kremlin assets legitimately in line with the
Yukos court ruling perhaps? Reciprocity would naturally follow, but if as
with sanctions, Poland, Romania and others are prepared for that, is that a
lever worthy of consideration (over and above the legal obligation to enact the
court ruling anyway).
What else? What costs the Kremlin money and time that cannot be
swiftly or easily replaced?
A coordinated, former Communist, multi-nation rolling up of Kremlin
espionage networks? Not spies under diplomatic cover that are swiftly and
easily replaced, but the illegals where money and time has been spent both on
training and integrating such networks in host nations for the purpose of years
(perhaps decades) of espionage?
After all, every European nation hosts, and is indeed aware of, Kremlin
networks on their soil – whether they roll them up or decide not to.
Rarely if ever has there been a coordinated, multinational rolling up of
such Kremlin inserted espionage people. It would be a major blow with
long lasting effect.
Again reciprocity raises its head – but how many illegal networks exist
inside Russia run by the Europeans vis a vis those run by the Kremlin within
every European nation, and what is lost by who and to what extent if mass
roll-ups occur in a coordinated effort?
The targeting and public exposure of all Kremlin sponsored (in full or
in part) politicians, political parties, NGOs and media outlets in the
European/international media? Reciprocity is not really an issue here for
the “5th Column” has long been targeted by the Kremlin inside Russia.
The coordinated seizing of dirty money/assets (and await the seizing of
foreign owned legitimate assets within Russia in response)? Is there
enough dirty money to have an impact within the territory of the “strongest
nations” President Duda intends to rally to the “peace” table?
Would the genuine will and ability to arm Ukraine with lethal weaponry
tip the balance? If so, which way?
A “squeeze” on Kaliningrad in some form or another?
What will the “Duda Format” bring to the “peace” table and effectively
be able to progress, using what levers that have otherwise been unemployed/underemployed?
How many nations are the “strongest nations” he speaks of? Too
many people sat around the table can make matters worse, not better.
Sometimes less is more!
Perhaps the “Duda Format” it will bring nothing more than a willingness
to pay the (additional) price for failing to reward Kremlin truculent,
belligerent, aggressive, unlawful behaviour. Perhaps that alone will be
enough. It was Lenin who said “Probe with a bayonet; if you meet steel, stop. If you meet
mush, then push” after all, – and Soviet
rehabilitation is currently en vogue in the absence
of a genuinely accepted Russian identity. Perhaps the “Duda Format” intends to be the
negotiating/diplomatic steel rather than the preceding Minsk mush?
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