BY:
Analysis: Pulling Erdogan from Western Orbit is a Russian Objective
One group that stands to gain significantly
from Erdogan’s “purges” are the local proponents of Eurasianist thinking. In
the days leading up to the attempted coup, Alexandr Dugin—the Russian ideologue
who is the father of the modern “Eurasian Movement” and a favorite Kremlin harbinger of conflict and annexation—was sitting in Ankara, alternatively visiting with
leading Turkish Eurasianists and close allies of President Erdogan.
Dugin, as Georgia and Ukraine have learned, is rarely near a conflict by chance,
often providing both the ideological foundations for modern
Russian expansionism and a kind of advance team for local mobilization.
As early as 2004, U.S. officials warned that Putin aimed to detach Turkey
from the West. Could the rapid realignment underway after the coup indicate
that Russia’s hybrid war to capture Turkey into its geopolitical orbit is
yielding results?
A TV coup?
In the aftermath of the failed
coup in Turkey, more than 6,000 members of the military have beenarrested; more than 50,000 education
personnel, police, judges, and civil servants have been fired; and millions of academics have been banned from leaving the country until
potential connections to the coup plot are evaluated. The speed with which the
“enemies lists” were produced, and with which the arrests were conducted, has
led to questions from
But the
“conspiracy theories” spinning out of recent events both mask and expose a deep
geopolitical shift underway in Turkey that could have profound consequences for
NATO and American allies in the region.
Stories are now circulating that Russian officials warned their Turkish counterparts of the pending coup, and
that Iranian officials were in contact with their Turkish counterparts
throughout the night. Both stories add to the sense that some elements inside
Turkey aimed to capitalize upon the coup to widen the distance between Turkey
and its Western allies and commitments.
The rapid purge of opponents has
amplified questions about the baffling coup attempt. Turkey’s military has staged
four successful coups—and this iteration deviated from that playbook in ways that defy easy explanation.
Istanbul’s bridges over the
Bosporus were blockaded. Black ops forces appeared at the hotel in Marmaris where President
Erdogan was supposedly staying, dropping down the side of the building on
rope-lines. Fighter jets broke the sound barrier over Istanbul and Ankara, and
tanks drove through the streets, projecting the appearance of broad military
involvement. Cadets from military academies were enlisted as manpower.
An international TV station was seized but continued to broadcast the dramatic conflict.
Communications were broadly uninterrupted throughout the country. Several broadcast text messages were even sent from Erdogan and his allies to Turkish
cellphone users, calling them to the streets to defend their nation.
These actions
required pre-planning but made little tactical sense—a series of powerful
visuals projecting that a coup was underway, and providing rally points for
media and demonstrators, but which held little value in securing strategic
assets, institutions, and national political leaders.
Under scrutiny, it’s not hard to
see why some observers believe the coup was staged. In a poll conducted after
the coup, one third of Turks said they believed Erdogan was behind
the coup.
The rise, fall, and return of Turkey’s Eurasianists
President Putin has been using
Dugin as an emissary to the Turkish elite since Dugin accompanied Putin on an official visit in 2004. His mission was to build Russia’s network of
influence to pull Turkey away from the West. This was based on his core idea that a “new Eurasian empire will
be constructed on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection
of Atlanticism, strategic control [over] the USA, and the refusal to allow
liberal values to dominate us.”
Dugin’s concept of a Turkic-Slavic
alliance found supporters in Turkish nationalist circles, especially those
identifying as Kemalists, who saw Eurasianism as an
alternative to both the European Union and Islamism.
This was especially true for some
senior Turkish military officers. Many of this group—which advocated for closer
ties with Russia and called for Turkey to leave NATO—were imprisoned and
convicted after being accused of participating in the “Ergenekon terrorist
organization,” another supposed group of coup plotters opposed to Erdogan. In
April, Turkey’s Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the convictions, saying the organization had never
existed.
Adding to the layers of
complexity, Gulenists in the judiciary had supposedly been instrumental in convicting the Ergenekon group, acting out another
scene in Turkey’s long securlarists/military vs. Islamists drama. The Ergenekon
trials became part of the break-up between Erdogan and Gulen. Gulen went into
exile, and the Ergenekon group—and its Eurasianist beliefs—have been enjoying a period of rehabilitation with Erdogan and the AKP ruling party.
Their revival may reflect a deeper
shift in geopolitics that has largely been overlooked, running parallel to
Erdogan’s own shift away from European structures following the Taksim protests in 2013.
Russian pressure
Dugin’s
presence in Ankara throughout the coup and his longterm activities are a
reminder of the multi-year, up-and-down Russian effort to bring Turkey into the
Eurasian orbit—more down than up in recent years.
The war in Syria and the rise of
ISIS have changed the dynamics of the region. As Putin backed and armed Assad,
Erdogan stood by Obama in calling for Assad to leave power. Turkey and
Russia ended generally warm relations and began to trade barbs; at one point Putin even called
for regime change in Turkey. These tensions came to a head after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet that
violated its airspace in November 2015.
In the months that followed,
Russia ramped up various forms of pressure on Turkey and its president. Russia stalled a $15 billion pipeline deal, banned Russian tourists
from traveling to Turkey, and levied other economic measures. In arming Kurdish militants in Syria and building ties with Iraqi Kurdistan, Russia played up Turkish fears
of Kurdish separatism. The Russian and Turkish militaries severed ties.
Russian warships sail almost daily through the Bosporus, sometimes brandishing arms, carrying men and materiel from
Sevastopol to Tartus. FSB agents are suspected of conducting a series of assassinations of “enemies of the Russian state” in Turkey. Both
measures serve to remind of the increasing Russian reach beyond the Black Sea.
Russia has also deployed so-called “anti-access/area denial” capabilities in
the eastern Mediterranean that could effectively shut down Turkish airspace.
Russian state media has frequently cited the rehabilitated Turkish
Eurasianists to build the story of a deep rift between Erdogan and the military
elite on Syria policy and ties to Russia. Russia, especially through agents
like Dugin, actively supports groups calling for a strategic realignment of
Turkish interests, building political pressure against Erdogan internally.
In May, Turkish Prime Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu resigned, signaling, in retrospect, an end
to the period of deal making with the EU on refugees and Turkish accession. By
the time Erdogan offered an apology to Russia at the end of June for the downing of the jet, Russian
pressure had clearly yielded results.
The bombing of the Istanbul airport by Russian-speaking members of ISIS the next day reinforced the belief that Turkey needed
a new approach to its Syria policy.
Dugin had long referred to Davutoglu as part of a “pro-American conspiracy”
(backed, of course, by Gulen) to keep Turkey from moving toward Russia. His
friends, the former military leaders of the Ergenekon group, are now part of
Dogu Perincek’s Homeland Party, which last week claimed they had been sent by “businessmen close to Erdogan”
to improve relations with Russia and re-establish ties with Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad.
The events of the last week have
likely limited Erdogan’s options with his Western partners. While Putin has
said little following the coup attempt, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry was
quick towarn that Turkey’s membership in NATO
might be at stake if they weaken their democracy.
Russian shadow over the coup
Kerry spent the night of the coup
locked away with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, hammering out the
details of a secret new agreement to cooperate on Syria. During these
discussions, Kerry called Obama; the White House then released a statement saying they supported the democratically elected
government of Turkey. Few others did until after the coup had failed.
Dugin, meanwhile, met less than two hours before the coup with close Erdogan ally and Mayor of Ankara Melih
Gokcek, who explained to Dugin that Turkey was divided between two groups:
patriots and Gulenists/American agents. He said the CIA had used the Gulen
movement to put Turkey “at loggerheads” with Russia. The pilots who had shot
down the Russian plane, Gokcek said, were also Gulenist agents following
American orders.
As parting words, Gokcek offered:
“We underestimated the power of the parallel state, which Gulen’s followers and
Americans created inside Turkey. It was our mistake. But we are going to make
it right now. The first step will be a new rapprochement with Moscow.” After
the coup, Gokcek announced that the pilots had been detained.
Dugin now
says the “U.S.-backed coup” was a Hail Mary pass to keep Turkey from realigning
with Russia.
But Russian state media has also
released a story saying Erdogan was prepared for the coup because
Russia intercepted—via listening stations in northern Syria that apparently monitor Turkish military transmissions—intelligence on the
coup and notified Turkey in advance. The Turkish military had earlier said they
received intel on the potential coup, which may have forced the plotters to initiate their plan earlier than intended.
A Realignment to Russia
The
nationalistic outpouring in support of Erdogan (which became profoundly
anti-American in nature when accusations of Gulenist involvement were made) and
Erdogan’s subsequent decision to enact deep purges throughout national
structures (which will have consequences with Western partners) both serve to
create distance between Turkey and the West.
The presence of certain Russian
actors around the margins of the Turkish coup does little to answer any
questions about what really happened on July 15. But it is clear that the
active measures taken against Turkey by Russia in the military, political, and
economic realms are yielding results. As another Kremlin ideologue, Sergey
Karaganov, said in an interview just days before the coup attempt: “In the face of our
problems with Turkey, we have pursued a clear, hard political line—with
success.”
Coercing
Turkey away from the West has been a goal pursued by Dugin since 1997. And, as
Lenin once said: “In politics it is not so important who directly advocates
particular views. What is important is who stands to gain from these views,
proposals, measures.”
In this sense, Russia had a good
week with Turkey. Erdogan’s military purge—which has cleared more than a quarter of generals from the ranks—may mean Eurasianists fill empty slots.
Putin and Erdogan have announced they will meet in early August.
Dugin’s media onslaught has
continued. He is calling for a Russian-Turkish alliance to expel the United States and NATO from the Black Sea, and to ensure a Turkish departure from NATO. Hesays Kerry suggested kicking Turkey out
of NATO to pre-empt Turkey’s announcement that it will withdraw. While there is
no clear way to remove a member from the alliance for bad behavior, quitting only takes a letter.
If Russia had wanted to design a
campaign of reflexive control—using disinformation to coerce an adversary into voluntarily
selecting actions that will be advantageous to Russia—against Turkey, it
couldn’t have done it any better. This may sound like the stuff of
conspiracies, but the idea that Russia knows how to use fiction for political
gain is hardly far-fetched. Estonia’s Foreign Minister recently described how
Russia is simulating a war over the Baltic sea in order to
show a war on state TV. If a made-for-TV war—why not a made-for-TV coup?
There are
profound consequences to ignoring Russia’s many-fronted hybrid war against the
West, and from failing to acknowledge that Turkey is, and has been, as much a
target of this war as Ukraine or the Baltic states. As long as these
explanations, which are amply documented with circumstantial and frequently
direct evidence, are dismissed as conspiracy theories, leaders can duck
responsibility for addressing the crisis.
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