What a difference a year makes. At this time in 2015,
Poland enjoyed more influence in Europe than at any point in its history. After
reforming and growing its economy in the years following its admission to the
EU, Poland—the union’s sixth most populous member with its eighth-largest
economy—earned a seat at Europe’s head table from which it had long been
excluded by partition, war and great-power struggle. Then in 2014, in a highly
symbolic gesture, the union’s leaders elevated Poland’s prime minister, Donald
Tusk, to the presidency of the European Council. Now an island of political and
economic stability, Poland’s voice and opinion became sought after in a way
they had never been before.
Fast forward to summer 2016.
Poland’s de facto leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, is back in power. Poland is now
sidelined in the EU, subject to its rule-of-law mechanism following the ruling
party’s assault on the Constitutional Tribunal. Polish leaders have soured
relations with their hugely important neighbor, Germany, by railing against
perceived German bullying of Polish interests. Poland’s reputation as a
reliable European partner is tarnished after its leaders refused to cooperate
on migration and climate change. Even President Obama, speaking at a press
conference alongside Poland’s President Andrzej Duda during the recent NATO
summit, called on Poland not to erode its democratic achievements. Once hailed
as a success story of European expansion, the success and vitality of Poland’s
democracy are being called into serious question for the first time since its
emergence from the Cold War.
Today EU watchers’ attention is focused on the fallout
of the UK’s decision to leave the EU, so Polish democratic backsliding has
fallen off the radar. Despite suggestions that Brexit could threaten the
European project’s future, as Angela Merkel related, “the EU is strong enough to withstand Britain’s
withdrawal . . .
it will be maintained with or without the UK.” The
original bedrock of the European project was, after all, Franco-German unity.
It later grew to include other countries and a broader mission of, among other
things, bolstering the rule of law. The UK was always an unenthusiastic
participant in that wider project, so the past few weeks’ market gyrations
notwithstanding, the EU will continue without it.
But the EU is far less likely to survive the
degradation of its norms by member states that were admitted a decade ago at
great risk and expense for the union. The EU’s success depends not only on open
trade and free movement, but on a common conviction that Europe cannot be
divided along the lines of rule of law. Many observers fear that the UK’s
departure from the union will inspire nativist parties in other countries to
seek their own independence referenda. While this is a risk, the financial and
political chaos surrounding the mechanics of Brexit—together with what could be
a final agreement granting the UK access to the common market only in exchange
for open borders and payments to the EU, à la Norway—will probably dissuade
some imitators from following suit.
Poland, on the other hand, offers Euroskeptics a more
attractive path forward. If the EU fails to address Poland’s democratic
backsliding as it failed to deal with Viktor Orban’s Hungary, Euroskeptic
parties may attempt to achieve some of their goals by denigrating EU norms
while extracting only the benefits of EU membership. Hungary, with fewer than
ten million people, was a fairly small case. But Poland is much larger, with
nearly forty million people, and could become a model for Euroskeptics
emboldened by Brussels’s inability or unwillingness to enforce rule-of-law
norms. If that happens, the purpose and character of the EU will be eroded far
more severely than by Brexit.
The United States has few tangible national-security
interests directly at stake with Poland’s democratic backsliding, and perhaps
little interest, given the many other issues it faces around the world. But the
United States has long been invested in the success of Europe’s integration,
and the new Polish government’s eagerness to enhance Poland’s relationship with
Washington gives it considerable leverage. President Obama’s decision to
criticize Poland’s democratic backsliding at the NATO summit was a prudent
action, and should be coupled with ongoing diplomatic pressure from the United
States to correct a tragically misdirected course.
Adam
Twardowski is a researcher in the Strategy and Statecraft Program at the Center
for a New American Security (CNAS).
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