By
PALO ALTO, Calif. — THE Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, continues to surprise. Russia’s military intervention in Syria, followed by a face-to-face meeting in Moscow
this week with that country’s president, Bashar al-Assad, has startled the
world.
As there was after Mr. Putin’s action in Ukraine
last year, there has been a chorus of commentary on his supposed strategic
genius. He is acting decisively, seizing the initiative and creating facts on
the ground — so the narrative goes, in contrast with the West’s feckless
pursuits in Syria.
The opposite is true.
Five years ago, Russia was in a much stronger
position, both at home and in the world. Today, Mr. Putin is playing defense,
doubling down on bad decisions guided by an outdated theory of international
politics.
Recognition of Russia’s mistakes, however, does
not guarantee future failure. The United States and our allies cannot stand
idly by and wait for Russia to fail. Instead, we must adopt a comprehensive
strategy to minimize the negative consequences of Russia’s actions and maximize
the positive ones of ours.
Five years ago, Russia was on the move in the
world. In 2010 in Ukraine, the Kremlin helped install its ally, Viktor F.
Yanukovych. Elsewhere in the former Soviet space, Russia’s leaders were making
progress on what would become the Eurasian Economic Union, their answer to the
European Union.
Moscow had also improved relations with Europe
and the United States. President Dmitri A. Medvedev even attended NATO’s Lisbon
summit meeting in 2010 and spoke of developing “a strategic partnership” that
would put “the difficult period in our relations behind us now.” The main topic
was cooperation on missile defense, not NATO expansion.
Both the American and Russian public noticed the
progress. In 2010, about two-thirds of Russians had a positive view of the United
States, while a similar proportion of Americans saw Russia as an ally or partner.
The Russian economy was returning to growth
after the 2008 financial crisis. Trade with the United States was expanding,
there were closer ties with European economies, and Russia was on track to join
the World Trade Organization.
In 2010, Russia also played an essential role in
securing new sanctions against Iran. In doing so, it demonstrated bold
international leadership even at the price of straining relations with an
important ally.
And then, in 2011, the people started getting in
the way.
For different reasons, societies in the Arab
world, Ukraine and Russia began to mobilize against their leaders. Initially,
President Medvedev sided with the people in the Middle East, notably abstaining from, rather than vetoing, the Security
Council resolution that authorized the use of force in Libya. Mr. Medvedev also
engaged with opposition leaders in Russia and introduced some modest political
reforms before exiting the Kremlin in May 2012.
Mr. Putin, however, had an opposite approach. He
believed that behind these protesters was an American hand, and that the
response to them — whether in Syria, Egypt, Russia or Ukraine — should be
coercion and force.
After his inauguration as president, Mr. Putin
pivoted hard against Russia’s demonstrators, labeling them traitors. His
tactics derailed the opposition’s momentum.
But his short-term successes have produced
long-term costs. Mr. Putin’s paranoia about independent political actors
nurtured a growing fear of business interests outside his oligarchical clique.
Economic reform stalled, investment declined and state ownership grew.
Political stagnation also settled in. For the
first two years of his third term as president, Mr. Putin’s approval rating
hovered around 60 percent, his lowest ever. Only his invasion of Ukraine eventually
propelled his approval rating back up.
In Ukraine, though, the crackdown on protesters
failed. By the time Mr. Yanukovych tried to clear the streets by force, as the
Kremlin advocated, his halfhearted attempt at strongman tactics backfired,
compelling him to flee.
Angered by what he saw as another C.I.A.
operation to overthrow a Russian ally, Mr. Putin struck back: He annexed Crimea
and attempted an even bigger land grab in eastern Ukraine, called Novorossiya
by expansion enthusiasts.
Again, the costs of these brief gains piled up.
As a result of sanctions and falling energy prices, the Russian economy has
shrunk to $1.2 trillion from $2 trillion in 2014. And NATO, once an alliance in
search of a mission, is now focused again on deterring Russia.
Mr. Putin has also been compelled to abandon the
Novorossiya project: His proxies in eastern Ukraine neither enjoy popular
support nor run an effective government. And his actions have guaranteed that
Ukraine will never join his Eurasian Economic Union or line up with Russia
again.
His policy toward another ally, Mr. Assad, has
failed, too. Despite blocking Security Council resolutions against Mr. Assad’s
government, providing weapons to Damascus and encouraging Syria’s allies to
come to the regime’s defense, Mr. Putin’s efforts have done little to
strengthen Mr. Assad’s rule. After four years of civil war, Mr. Assad governs
less territory and faces more formidable foes. That’s why Mr. Putin had to
intervene — to save his autocratic ally from defeat.
In the short term, Russia’s Syrian bombing
campaign has energized the Syrian Army and its allies to launch a
counteroffensive against opposition rebels — that is, against everyone except
the Islamic State. But in the long run, Russian airstrikes alone cannot restore
Mr. Assad’s authority over the whole country.
Mr. Putin is adept at short-term tactical
responses to setbacks, but less talented at long-term strategy. Even with no
response from the West, Mr. Putin’s foreign adventures will finally fail,
especially as domestic economic problems continue to fester.
But the United States and its allies should seek
to shorten that time by pushing back against Russia on multiple fronts. As Mr.
Putin goes all in to prop up his ally in Syria, we should do the same with our
partners and allies — not only in Syria, but in Europe and around the world.
In Syria, the United States cannot allow Russia
to eliminate all actors except Mr. Assad and the Islamic State. We must provide
more arms and support to other rebel groups. We should warn Mr. Putin that
further attacks against non-Islamic State rebels will compel us to protect
them, either by enforcing a no-fly zone or by arming them with antiaircraft
weapons.
The United States and Western allies should
capitalize on Mr. Putin’s attention being diverted to Syria to deepen support
for Ukraine. In return for progress on economic reform, especially
anti-corruption measures, we can offer greater financial aid for infrastructure
and social service programs. And now is the moment to bolster the Ukrainian
Army by providing more military training and defensive weapons.
Elsewhere in Europe, NATO should station ground
forces on the territory of allies most threatened by Russia. Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine violated the
NATO-Russia Founding Act and other treaties. In response, our NATO allies
deserve credible new commitments from us.
Finally, we must continue to pursue long-term
foreign policy objectives that demonstrate American leadership and underscore
Russia’s isolation. Ratifying the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, closing
a multilateral climate deal by the end of the year, deepening ties with India
and managing relations with China are all parts of America’s grander strategy.
The United States clearly has an interest in the
emergence of a strong, rich and democratic Russia, fully integrated into the
international community of states. Eventually, new Russian leaders also may
realize that Russia’s path to greatness requires reform at home and responsible
leadership abroad. Propping up failing dictators through the use of force is not
grand strategy.
Right now, though, the only way to nudge Russia
in a different direction is to contain and push back on Mr. Putin’s current
course, not only by our immediate response in Syria, but in a sustained,
strategic manner around the world.
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