Neil
Buckley, Eastern Europe Editor
Ukraine’s autumn political season began violently — with the first deaths in protests in
Kiev since last year’s revolution. Yet events since then have brought tentative
hopes the conflict in the country’s east might be waning.
When parliament voted on August 31 on
constitutional changes handing more power to Ukraine’s regions — and paving the
way for separatist eastern districts to receive “special status”, as required
by the Minsk peace agreement — the streets outside exploded.
As radical nationalists demonstrated against the
plans, a fighter on leave from one of Ukraine’s “volunteer” battalions in the
east threw a grenade. Three national guardsmen died.
Inside parliament, Ukraine’s five-party
governing coalition fractured. The parties of President Petro
Poroshenko and Premier Arseniy Yatseniuk were
forced to rely on former supporters of ousted president Viktor Yanukovich to
secure enough votes to pass the decentralisation measures in a first reading.
Yet the next day, as an eastern ceasefire came
into force, the guns in east Ukraine fell silent for the first time in months.
Days later in eastern Ukraine’s Donbass, a radical separatist leader was deposed
in an internal coup by a figure seen as more pragmatic — and controllable by
Moscow.
The Kiev violence highlighted how explosive the
Donbass issue remains — and the dangers of the far-right groups that came to
the fore in the revolution’s final stages, and with which the government has
since made uneasy accommodations.
But the broader developments suggest Mr
Poroshenko and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, are seeking to
extricate themselves from the conflict — while avoiding unpalatable compromises,
and balancing demands of domestic constituencies.
Both are seeking, therefore, to exploit
ambiguities in February’s hastily negotiated second Minsk agreement to impose
their own interpretation. It is not clear if “Minsk II” can withstand the
competing pressures.
The heart of the issue is the degree of
“self-government”, to use the Minsk language, to be granted to rebel-held
regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. Kiev is prepared to offer limited self-rule
provided it has some political control.
Mr Poroshenko aims to grant what is coyly called
a “special manner of operation for local government” to the separatist regions
as part of a broader initiative to decentralise more powers to all Ukrainian
regions.
The problem is his plans go too far for the
governing coalition’s dissenting parties — let alone Ukraine’s far-right groups
— who say the proposals amount to kowtowing to Moscow. But they do not go far
enough for Russia.
The Kremlin wants the separatist regions to
remain in Ukraine too — but in a looser, quasi-confederal structure, with a
high degree of autonomy enshrined in constitution.
They could then act as destabilising instruments of Russia’s political influence, and obstacles to Ukraine’s greater integration with the west. The Russian-backed separatist leaders have demanded a veto, for example, on Ukrainian membership of Nato.
Though fighting flared in June and August, a long-feared large-scale rebel offensive failed to materialise this summer. Western and Ukrainian officials
increasingly believe Moscow has abandoned thoughts of grabbing a bigger chunk
of the country.
But Mr Putin is not prepared to sacrifice his base political goals in the
Donbass, or to be seen as going soft on Kiev. His propaganda machine has spent
months persuading Russian citizens that Kiev’s leaders are western-backed
“fascists”, with sanctions-related hardships the price of Moscow’s noble stand
against them.
Simply allowing the conflict to remain unresolved or become “frozen”, such
as Moldova’s Transnistria, may also be insufficient for the Kremlin. That would
not ensure Donbass would remain a tool of Russian influence.
Perhaps for that reason, Mr Putin has agreed to meet the French, German and
Ukrainian leaders in Paris on October 2 — their first four-way meeting since
they negotiated Minsk II in February.
They will have much to discuss as two crunch points loom. Kiev’s proposed
special status for the separatist regions will come into force only if they
hold internationally monitored local elections under Ukrainian law. Defiant
rebel leaders are instead planning elections under their own rules on October
18.
Second, Ukraine’s parliament may fail to muster the two-thirds majority
needed to pass the constitutional change package at a final reading before the
end of the year, as Minsk stipulates.
Either event could yet see Minsk collapse — and plunge peace efforts in the
east once again into chaos.
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